Information

Ba'ath Party


The Ba'ath Party was established in Syria in 1952. Initially, its main ideological objectives were secularism, socialism and pan-Arab unionism. The Ba'athists became extremely influential in the years following the Suez War and its influence spread from Syria to Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.

After the war Gamal Abdel Nasser was acknowledged as leader of the Arab world. Egypt now joined with Syria to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). The Ba'athists originally supported this move but they became disillusioned by Nasser's dictatorial methods and they resigned from government in December, 1959. Two years later Syria withdrew from the UAR.

In 1963 the Ba'ath Party led a successful military coup in Syria. The new government carried out a programme of large-scale nationalization. However, the government was overthrown by a military coup in 1966.

The Ba'ath Party in Iraq came to power following a military coup on 17th July 1968. This brought to power Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. He quickly nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company and introduced wide-ranging social and economic reforms.

The new government ruthlessly suppressed opposition it did agree to enter negotiations with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). In March 1970 the government promised to grant the Kurds a degree of autonomy.

On 6th October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel. Two days later the Egyptian Army crossed the Suez Canal while Syrian troops entered the Golan Heights. Iraq joined in the Arab-Israeli War but was defeated when Israeli troops counter-attacked on 8th October. Iraq was able to hurt the Western economy when it participated in the oil boycott against Israel's supporters.

It now became clear to the Kurdish Democratic Party that Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr was not going to keep his promises about Kurdish autonomy. In the spring 1974 fighting broke out between the Kurds and the government's armed forces. In March 1975 Iran closed its border with Iraq which led to the collapse of the Kurdish military force. Kurdish villages were destroyed and their inhabitants resettled in specially constructed villages surrounded by barbed wire and fortified posts.

Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr also suppressed non-Kurds in Iraq. In July 1978 a decree was passed which made all non-Ba'thist political activity illegal and membership of any other political party punishable by death for all those who were members or former members of the armed forces.

In July 1979 Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr resigned and was replaced by Saddam Hussein. In the next few months Saddam Hussein swiftly executed his political rivals. Increasing oil revenues allowed him to increase spending on welfare schemes. A student of Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein arranged for portraits and statues to be placed all over the country. He also created the Republican Guard, an elite presidential security force.


Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region

The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region (Arabic: حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي – قطر سوريا ‎ Ḥizb al-Ba‘th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī – Quṭr Sūriyā), officially the Syrian Regional Branch (Syria being a "region" of the Arab nation in Ba'ath ideology), is a neo-Ba'athist organisation founded on 7 April 1947 by Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar and followers of Zaki al-Arsuzi. It was first the regional branch of the original Ba'ath Party (1947–1966) before it changed its allegiance to the Syrian-dominated Ba'ath movement (1966–present) following the 1966 split within the original Ba'ath Party. The party has ruled Syria continuously since the 1963 Syrian coup d'état which brought the Ba'athists to power.


For more information

Blaydes, a former Hoover National Fellow, described the archives as “invaluable” for her forthcoming book, State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018). The Ba’ath Party, she found, used varying mechanisms to encourage loyalty and prevent uprisings.

“The archives covered everyday topics of governance, including the mobilizational activities of the Ba’ath Party to the monitoring political preferences of high school students,” said Blaydes, who is also an associate professor of political science at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Among the most intriguing aspects were the numerous memoranda about “rumors” circulating in Iraqi society during the 1990s and early 2000s.

“These included some that were quite far-fetched, like a rumor that Bill Clinton’s mother was born in Mosul, to the mundane, like a rumor that the price of tomatoes was going to increase,” she said.

Blaydes found more than 2,000 so-called rumors in the Ba’ath Party files many of them either undermined the regime or sought to mobilize different populations toward some collective action.

Terror, wrought in sometimes utterly mundane ways, was a constant presence in Iraqi society, as the archives revealed to Blaydes. During the mid-1990s, Hussein ordered that people who deserted from the military would have an ear cut off.

“I found one document which showed the number of deserters who had been caught in different parts of the country as well as the number who had had their ears removed. A follow-up memo complained that doctors were not cutting off enough ears, suggesting forms of bureaucratic non-compliance,” Blaydes said.

Blaydes also found that punishment was often meted out against the families of individuals who failed to support the party.


December 10, 2020: The Ba'ath Party of Alveria is officially founded.

December 23, 2020: The first party member is appointed to a government position (SwissMercenary3 as Secretary of Justice)

January 22, 2021: The Ba'ath Party gains 2 seats within the Alverian Senate. This was the first time the party had gained seats in the Senate.

February 2021: SwissMercenary3 becomes the first party member to run for President.

February 5, 2021: The Alveria First Committee is formed as a force within the Senate to push domestic issues and stand against imperialism.

March 5, 2021: The Alveria First Committee is rebranded as the Senate Ba'ath Conference.

March 11, 2021: The party splinters as biden_gameing leaves the party to form the Bidome Party. Party member darthassasin45 would also leave, further splintering the party.

March 19, 2021: The party surpasses 10 members.

May 16, 2021: The Ba'ath Party National Headquarters is opened in District 5.

June 8, 2021: SwissMercenary3 takes a Leave of Absence from the party leadership and GrassyPizza9 steps in as Interim Chairman of the party.


Ba'ath Party - History

The Iraqi Baath party was one of the tools by which Saddam Hussein maintained a tight grip on his country.

The Arab Socialist Baath Party, to give it its full name, was founded in Syria in the 1940s by a small group of French-educated Syrian intellectuals - Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim.

The party's ideology is pan-Arab, secular nationalism.

A committed Baathist should see individual Arab states as regions or provinces of the larger Arab nation.

The party is secular, and in the beginning, was steeped in Socialist ideology.

The Baath party also became the ruling party and bureaucracy in Syria - a fact that led to great rivalry between Damascus and Baghdad, rather than alliance.

The Iraqi Baath party was founded in 1951 and had 500 members three years later.

Saddam Hussein joined it as a 20-year-old in 1956.

The Baathist hold on power did not last long. Within months, Brigadier Qasim's ally, Colonel Abdel Salam Muhammad Aref, seized power.

Saddam Hussein was elected assistant general secretary of the party in 1966 and staged a successful coup in 1968.

General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, also from Tikrit and a relative of the Saddam Hussein's, took power.

The two worked closely together and became the dominant force in the Baath party, with Saddam Hussein gradually outstripping the president's leadership.

Though the Baath party was formally the institution that ruled Iraq, actual power, even in the early days, was in the hands of a narrow elite united by family and tribal ties, not ideology.

Baathism was associated with radical Arab nationalism - a key barometer for this was a hardline approach to the Palestinian issue.

In the late 1980s, the party claimed more than 1.5 million members, about 10% of Iraqis.

The party had a highly regimented structure. At the lowest level - the village - it had cells of between three and seven people, rising up to regional commands and a national command.

The Baath was meant to rule and make policy by consensus.

In Iraq, all major decisions went through Saddam Hussein who from 1979 was president, head of the Revolutionary Command Council and secretary general of the Baath party.

In 1979 several high-ranking Baathists were tried and were executed for allegedly planning a coup. Other prominent party members were forcibly retired in 1982.

In the 1980's, the socialist ideology of the party accommodated itself to capitalism.

Nationalised industries were privatised. Iraqi businessmen trying to take advantage of the country's oil wealth often pursued their ambitions through the party.

As part of Saddam Hussein's power structure and complicit in his brutal rule, the Baath party was expected to disintegrate with the end of his rule.

Revenge attacks against Baath officials and party buildings were widely predicted and have happened.

US plans for Iraq after Saddam Hussein are assumed to include the dismantling of the Baath.

Analysts have warned though that the destruction of the Baath might lead to the destruction of the vast numbers of civil organisations swallowed up by the Baath during years of totalitarian rule.


Ba’ath Party Essay

The Ba’ath (“Renaissance” in Arabic) was a pan-Arab political party founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah alDin Bitar. From Syria, Aflaq (1910–89) came from a Greek Orthodox family he studied at the Sorbonne and became a teacher in a well-known secondary school in Damascus. Bitar (1912–80), from a prominent Damascene Sunni Muslim family, also studied in France and taught at the same school as Aflaq. In 1940 they led a small group known as the Movement of Arab Renaissance, or Ba’ath, that professed a pan-Arab, anti-imperialism program. Aflaq was the preeminent ideologue of the party, which published a series of papers dealing with Arab nationalism, Arab union, and Arab socialism, as opposed to a strictly Marxist ideology. The party’s motto was “Unity, Freedom, Socialism.”

In 1947 the group merged with another nationalist party to form the Arab Ba’ath Party. The new party attracted members including nationalistic youth disaffected minorities, especially the Alawites in Syria and young army officers. In 1953 the party unified with Akram Hourani’s Arab Socialist Party to become the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. A popular nationalist, Hourani had a far wider following than Aflaq, and his participation in the party enlarged its support and membership.

The party was organized into cells on the grassroots level, giving it considerable flexibility. Groups of cells (two to seven) were formed into party divisions that merged into party sections representing entire towns or rural districts and, at the highest level, party branches. At periodic party congresses all the party branches met. The national command was the executive that exercised considerable power from the top down.

In 1958 the Ba’ath strongly supported the creation of the United Arab Republic but became disenchanted with having to take a secondary role to that of Nasser and Egypt. The Ba’ath supported Syria’s withdrawal from the union in 1961, and a military coup in 1963 brought the Ba’ath into power. Bitar and Aflaq both supported the so-called civilian wing of the party versus the military wing, but they were outmaneuvered in 1966. Although he retained the title of secretary-general of the party, Aflaq held no real power and went into exile. He ultimately moved to Baghdad in 1974, where he enjoyed considerable respect but no real power. In 1989 Aflaq died, whereupon the Iraqi regime announced that he had converted to Islam prior to his death. After considerable infighting among Ba’athist officers in Syria, Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970 and proceeded to establish a regime that lasted into the 21st century. Bitar split from the party owing to disagreements with the Assad regime he went into exile in Paris, where he was assassinated—possibly by Syrian intelligence—in 1980.

The Ba’ath established branches in Jordan, Lebanon, North and South Yemen, and other Arab states. Al-Saiqa was the Palestinian branch of the Ba’ath under control of Syria. Although these separate branches played some limited political roles in their respective countries, Syria and Iraq remained the centers of the party’s power.


The Banality of Authoritarian Control: Syria’s Ba’ath Party Marches On

The violent struggle for Syria continues after a decade of conflict that has wrought unspeakable destruction, displacement, and death. Approaching ten years, the conflict shows no signs of abating and Syrians enter the new year confronting new challenges to their very survival having endured the effects of a global pandemic and worsening economic crisis. Despite numerous setbacks, the political organization that has dominated the country since March 1963, the Arab Socialist Ba&rsquoath Party, continues to control Syria&rsquos political and social soul, its quest to maintain and expand its dominance having primarily played out in the background. The Ba&rsquoath has long been described as a hollowed-out political organization bereft of ideology and relevance within the broader scope of Syria&rsquos authoritarian politics. Yet, although its social and political preeminence has been challenged and diminished over the last decade, the Ba&rsquoath Party remains one of the regime&rsquos most effective institutions and mechanisms through which it maintains its authoritarian grip. The process by which the ruling party has worked to resuscitate itself is a key factor in Assad&rsquos survival, beyond security forces, and militias. Social and Political mobilization remain vital pillars of regime survival as it navigates war, sanctions, currency collapse, a bread crisis, and a global pandemic.

Consolidating Political Power

Since early 2018, the Ba&rsquoath has labored to rebuild its institutions in areas formerly held by rebels while consolidating its presence in regime-held territories. These efforts were apparent when the party reasserted its social and political control through local elections held in September 2018, the first since 2011. The election, which the Ba&rsquoath helped organize, served as a mechanism to reward Ba&rsquoath loyalists by promoting them to positions of power and ensuring the party&rsquos ascendency in local administration. Ba&rsquoathist lists ran unopposed in some localities, while in others the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos control of drawing up electoral lists enabled it to curtail the potential influence of other party&rsquos within the Ba&rsquoath-led National Progressive Front (NPF). This ensured that the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos candidates would take a commanding lead, a move that enraged the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and prompted it to withdraw its candidates in Homs and Suweida from the NPF list.

A little more than a year later, in February 2020, the Ba&rsquoath held internal elections to select its leadership throughout Syria in which it rewarded &ldquoloyalists&rdquo by promoting them to positions of power. In the months preceding party elections, ranking party members spoke on a number of occasions of the necessity of removing so-called &ldquogrey members&rdquo (al-Ramadiyyin), members who had not demonstrated sufficient loyalty, from the party&rsquos leadership. Internal elections aimed to consolidate support for the regime and Assad by &ldquodemocratically&rdquo weeding out these so-called &ldquogrey members.&rdquo Several party branches objected to the results and accused central leadership with interfering to ensure &ldquomore loyal candidates&rdquo were elected. The party leadership appeared to back down initially, but the protests ultimately failed to alter the outcome.

National parliamentary elections in July 2020 saw the Ba&rsquoath further consolidate its political power. While the party&rsquos electoral victory and dominance in parliament was expected, the extent to which the Ba&rsquoath would secure its share of seats in Syria&rsquos legislative body was not. Having postponed the election several times before settling on the July date, political maneuvers by the Assad regime indicated the Ba&rsquoath was determined to undermine any rising NPF candidate it deemed a threat. By the start of 2020, the Ba&rsquoath had curtailed two SSNP factions, the reformist-minded Intifada faction, and the Rami Makhlouf-backed Amana faction, but allowed the Beirut-based Markaz faction&rsquos activities to continue unabated on the battlefield and in parliament, where it held seven seats. The Ba&rsquoath eventually excluded a large number of SSNP members off NPF electoral lists only three secured seats in the new parliament in July 2020. Official results showed the NPF won 177 out of 250 parliamentary seats of the 177 seats, at least 160 were Ba&rsquoath Party members, growing its total share. The election results delivered a warning to former Ba&rsquoath Party members and supporters of a cross-sectarian government who were increasingly turning to other pro-regime parties.

Commanding Popular Support

By focusing on its internal organization and its political dominance, the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos attentiveness has succeeded in strengthening its social bases of support within Syrian society. The Ba&rsquoath has paid particular attention to maintaining its control of workers unions, such as the General Federation of Trade Union Workers and the General Federation of Peasants, among others, to bolster the party&rsquos and the regime&rsquos influence and curtail independent activism. Senior Ba&rsquoath party officials not only serve as the leaders of most of these associations, but these associations contribute to the regime&rsquos patronage networks the General Federation of Peasants has been used &ldquoto promote patronage and clientelist networks by favoring peasants and farmers loyal to the Federation and the Syrian government more broadly.&rdquo The scholar Joseph Daher noted that the Ba&rsquoath had worked to weaken and marginalize unions and professional associations in the early 2000s while it pursued liberal economic policies. This changed with the outbreak of the war as these unions gained new importance as a potential, though ineffective, source for pro-regime mobilization.

The Ba&rsquoath has also endeavored to establish itself among Syria&rsquos youth to bridge the gap between it and the party&rsquos older generation and reinvigorate the party. On the anniversary of the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos founding, an editorial in the official daily al-Ba&rsquoth mused that younger members must be inspired and remember the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos history in order to confront the challenges facing the country today, noting that it is the responsibility of older Ba&rsquoathists to inspire and to renew the meaning of the party&rsquos history in the present. Party cadres are active in Syria&rsquos universities and have previously used the universities as recruitment centers for the party&rsquos militia. Further, the party leadership has searched for ways to mobilize youth and the various youth organizations it controls, such as the National Union of Students, Revolutionary Youth Union, and the General Sports Union, to serve roles At a July 2020 meeting of the National Union of Syrian Students, Hilal al-Hilal, the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos assistant general secretary, praised the youth as &ldquorole models&rdquo for defending the universities. Hilal has been instrumental in using the party to implement the regime&rsquos policies and enforce security at the local level and act as a political emissary to allies abroad.

Most recently, the Ba&rsquoath and the Syrian regime have worked to exert their control over Syria&rsquos official religious institutions. The Ba&rsquoath succeeded in preventing the election of any Sunni religious elite to the parliament, and in December 2020, Assad indicated in a speech on the role of Islam in society that the Ba&rsquoathist state best represents Islam. Thus, Ba&rsquoathist, state-led Islam provides proper religious interpretations that form the moral foundations of Syrian society as opposed to other interpretations of Islam, like those of the rebels, that have undermined Syria&rsquos security and social cohesion. Furthermore, Assad&rsquos December speech and the speech by Syria&rsquos Minister of Religious Endowments, Muhammad Abd al-Satir al-Sayyid, made it clear that the Ba&rsquoath seeks to promote its Arab nationalist credentials once again, even going so far as to directly attack Syrian nationalism. Sayyid&rsquos words provoked a strong rebuke from the SSNP but the message is clear: The extent to which any Syrian nationalist notions will be tolerated by the Ba&rsquoath is limited to whether they are aligned with the Ba&rsquoath&rsquos current definition of Arabism.

While the Ba&rsquoath has hemorrhaged grassroots support over the course of the last decade and many Syrians abhor and resent the party and its continued dominance of the country, the Ba&rsquoath Party&rsquos hold on power appears to be growing tighter. To be sure, the regime does not control the entire territory of Syria and would not have survived without the support of Iran and Russia. Yet, barring an Iranian or Russian withdrawal of support from the regime, the Ba&rsquoath party will continue to march on and reassert itself as a key pillar of Bashar al-Assad&rsquos authoritarian rule.

Dr. Carl Yonker is a lecturer in the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is the author of The Rise and Fall of Greater Syria: A Political History of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, forthcoming in May 2021 with De Gruyter. Follow him on Twitter: @IsmiFallah

Christopher Solomon is a defense analyst, a contributor for the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Co-Editor at Syria Comment. His book In Search of Greater Syria: The History and Politics of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party is forthcoming in June 2021 with I.B.Tauris/Bloomsbury. Follow him on Twitter: @Solomon_Chris

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.


Ba'ath Party

The Ba'ath party was founded in Syria in 1928 by Michel Aflaq (or Michel Aflak) and Salah al-Din Bitar with a pan-Arab nationalist program and elements of both Marxism and fascism. Aflak and Bitar were influenced by Arab nationalist trends that had begun in time of the Turks, inspired in part by the Islamic and Arab reform ideologies of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), his student Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Abduh's student, Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935). These thinkers called for a renewal of Islam, with limited borrowing of concepts from the West. Abduh in particular was active in promoting Arab autonomy within Ottoman Turkey, and had placed great hopes in the Young Turks. Rida grew increasingly anti-Western with time, and was a great influence on Hassan El-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood. While Aflak was a Greek Orthodox Christian, Ba'ath ideology adopted an affinity for Islam, and Pan-Arabists saw one of their goals as asserting the primacy of the Arabs in the Muslim world. It represented fascist and secularist ideas, and attracted support of minorities, particularly Alawi . Pan-Arabism as represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser was a kindred movement. Both Syria and Iraq were ruled by Ba'athist regimes, but the regimes were rivals. The Lebanese Ba'ath party split from the Syrian party in 1966 and moved to Iraq in 1968. In Iraq, the Ba'ath party was overthrown after the US invasion of 2003.

Synonyms and alternate spellings: Ba'th, Baath

Note - This encyclopedia is a work in progress. It is far from complete and is being constructed and improved all the time. If you would like to contribute articles or expansions of existing articles, please contact news (at) mideastweb.org. Suggestions and corrections are welcome. The concise version of this dictionary is at our Middle East Glossary.

Spelling - Spelling of words in Middle-Eastern languages is often arbitrary. There may be many variants of the same name or word such as Hezbollah, Hizbolla, Hisbolla or Husayn and Hussein . There are some conventions for converting words from Semitic languages such as Arabic and Hebrew . There are numerous variant renderings of the same Arabic or Hebrew words, such as "Hizbollah," "Hisbulla" etc. It is not possible to find exact equivalents for several letters.

Pronunciation - Arabic and Hebrew vowels are pronounced differently than in English. "o" is very short. The "a" is usually pronounced like the "a" in m a rket, sometimes as the "a" in "Arafat." The " 'A " is guttural. " 'H "- the 'het ('Hirbeh, 'Hebron, 'Hisbollah') designates a sound somewhat similar to the ch in "loch" in Scots pronunciation, but made by touching the back of your tongue to the roof of your mouth. The CH should be pronounced like Loch, a more assertive consonant than 'het.

The "Gh" combination, and sometimes the "G," designate a deep guttural sound that Westerners may hear approximately as "r." The "r" sound is always formed with the back of the tongue, and is not like the English "r."

All original materials at MidEastWeb are copyright by MidEastWeb and/or by their authors unless otherwise noted. Please do not copy materials from this Web site to your Web site or to forums without permission. Please tell your friends about MidEastWeb. Please forward these materials in e-mails to friends with links to this URL - http://www.mideastweb.org and to the URL of the material. You can print out materials for your own use or classroom use, giving the URL of MidEastWeb. For pages marked Copyright , printed material should bear this notice:

and should give the URL of the original. Reproduction in any other form - by permission only. Consult detailed terms of use and copyright information


United Arab Republic period: 1958󈞩

On 24 June 1959, Fuad al-Rikabi, the 1st Regional Secretary of the Iraqi Regional Branch, called a press conference in Beirut, Lebanon in which he condemned the National Command, accusing them of not living up their official pan-Arab principles. [17] According to Rikabi he spoke on the behalf of the Iraqi Regional Command. [17] He further accused them of conspiring against the UAR. [17] The National Command, Rikabi said, had taken over the Iraqi Regional Branch organization by illegal means, and had established a puppet Regional Command. [17] This was confirmed by the National Command, which responded to criticism by stating that Rikabi had left his post as Regional Secretary on 29 November 1959, and that he was unqualified to speak on the party's behalf. [17]

The 3rd National Congress, held 27 August – 1 September 1959, was attended by delegates from "Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, South Arabia, the Gulf, Arab South, Arab Maghreb, Palestine and Party student organisations in Arab and other universities outside the [Arab] homeland". [18] The congress endorsed the dissolution of the Syrian Regional Branch, which had been decided by Aflaq and Bitar in 1958. [19]

The National Command expelled Rimawi from the Ba'ath Party in September 1959, because if his opportunism and his failure to appear in a National Command meeting which was investigation him on charges of financial irregularities. [20] On 6 September 1959 Rimawi and Gharbiyah issued a resolution which declared the National Command resolution null and void, and denied the allegations which had been leveled against Rimawi. [20] In May 1960, Rimawi had established a rival National Command, [21] an organ which would develop into the Arab Socialist Revolutionary Ba'ath Party (ASBP), a pro-UAR party. [22] The Revolutionary Ba'ath Party stopped its activity in either 1962 or 1963. [22] By 1966, the Regional Branch had 1,000 members. [23]

On 2 February 1960 the National Command, in the presence of Rikabi, elected a Temporary Regional Command with Talib Hussein ash-Shabibi as Regional Secretary. [17] Not long after, in July 1960, the 3rd Regional Congress of the Iraqi Regional Branch called on the national leadership to investigate Rikabi. [17] The National Command investigated him in 1960, and expelled him from the party on 15 June 1961. [17] Rikabi was later reported to be a member of the ASBP, [24] and Radio Cairo continued to refer to him as the Regional Secretary of the Iraqi Regional Branch. [24]

The 4th National Congress, held in August 1960, reversed the decision reached at the 3rd National Congress, which supported the dissolution of the Syrian Regional Branch. [25] It was mainly attended by representatives from the Lebanese Regional Branch. [26] The congress had a strongly anti-Nasserite tendency, and the traditional leadership of Aflaq and Bitar was criticized. [27] The delegates decided to deemphasize pan-Arabism for Marxian interpretation of socialism, and criticized the traditional leadership for entering Syria into the UAR. [27] Discontent with Egyptian dominance of the UAR, led elements opposed to the union under Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, to seize power on 28 September 1961. Two days later, the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. [28]


Capture, Trial and Death

In the months that followed, an intensive search for Saddam began. While in hiding, Saddam released several audio recordings, in which he denounced Iraq&aposs invaders and called for resistance. Finally, on December 13, 2003, Saddam was found hiding in a small underground bunker near a farmhouse in ad-Dawr, near Tikrit. From there, he was moved to a U.S. base in Baghdad, where he would remain until June 30, 2004, when he was officially handed over to the interim Iraqi government to stand trial for crimes against humanity.

During the subsequent trial, Saddam would prove to be a belligerent defendant, often boisterously challenging the court&aposs authority and making bizarre statements. On November 5, 2006, Saddam was found guilty and sentenced to death. The sentencing was appealed, but was ultimately upheld by a court of appeals. On December 30, 2006, at Camp Justice, an Iraqi base in Baghdad, Saddam was hanged, despite his request to be shot. He was buried in Al-Awja, his birthplace, on December 31, 2006.


Watch the video: Ya Šabāba-lArbi  Anthem of the Baath Party (December 2021).